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Abstract 
The protracted conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta area in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea harbours 
complex implications for security in the region. At the centre of the conflict is the agitation by the 
mainly Ijaw and Ogoni ethnic nationalities for mineral resource control, national self-determination 
and/or more robust constitutional integration into the Nigerian state, environmental rights and 
mitigation of extant degradation, as well as quest for institutionalisation of genuine federal fiscal 
policy and practice. Relying on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), with its emphasis on 
human and environmental security as compared with traditional state-centred security, the article 
argues that if allowed to exacerbate, the conflict portends grave danger and transnational security 
challenge for Nigeria, the West African sub-region and the entire continent, considering the huge 
population and the geo-strategic status of Nigeria. The efforts of the Nigerian state in addressing the 
lingering crisis and the role of external powers in engendering peace in the region also come under 
focus. The authors call for holistic proactive measures to stem the conflicts from escalation and spread 
to the entire region. The paper is divided into five sections: Firstly, it presents the concept, meaning 
and nature of RSCT; secondly, it justifies the application and relevance of RSCT to the study and 
understanding of security threats; thirdly, it examines the characteristics of RSC; fourthly, it explains 
regional security challenges and then suggests mechanisms to deal with those in the West African 
region; and fifthly, it assesses the effectiveness or otherwise of the measures adopted by the Nigerian 
state to confront the challenge as well as suggest policy options for an enduring peace in the Niger 
Delta area and the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
KEY WORDS: Niger Delta, regional security complex, security, transnational challenge, 
conflict, peace, oil 
Introduction 
Conceptualizing security is always a contested issue. While some scholars view security as 
primarily concerned with the preservation of the state and its core values, others in the 
„comprehensive security‟ genre have argued for the broadening of the concept to include non-
state entities and personalities. This article is concerned primarily with Nigeria‟s national 
security in the Niger Delta and its implications for regional security. However, a 
conceptualization of national security will be in order. Ullman argues that “a threat to 
national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a 
relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state, or (2) 
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a 
state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state” 
(Ullman 1983).  No doubt, the two aspects of security highlighted by Ullman are sufficiently 
present in the Niger Delta debacle which has defied all solutions as it seems to come alive 
each time the agitations looked simmered.  
 
As observed by Carmody (2005), “investment in oil production can fuel conflict, as there is 
political competition to control access to oil rents, and governments can afford to buy new 
arms.” In most cases, “only negligible proportions of oil revenue are reinvested in source 
areas, which have to bear the negative environmental consequences of oil flaring and spills” 
(Camody 2005). The case of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is no longer a local issue as it 
has assumed international dimensions. The environmental degradation in the Niger Delta is 
legendary despite producing massive oil wealth.  
 
Carmody asserts that “Ogoniland, in Nigeria, has no water or electricity infrastructure,” 
adding that "these conditions may generate local resistance.” Besides, human security needs 
to be operationalized in line with the United Nations Development Programme‟s (UNDP) 
definition of human security. This comprises “two mutually reinforcing concepts: (i) 
protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life and (ii) safety from 
such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” (Salih 2001:68). The Delta area is 
suffering from these twin concepts and the efforts to mitigate it have not met with the 
expectations of the community thereby fuelling incessant conflicts. For Tieku (2004), 
“security is interdependent and multi-dimensional as a result of increased interdependence, 
globalization and internationalization”. Therefore, this paper looks beyond the conflict area 
and examines the broader implications for peace and security in the sub-region.   
 
The international community, which derives energy source from the Niger Delta has also paid 
lip-service to efforts aimed at alleviating the plights of the locals. Seager and Macalister 
(2004) posit that the conditions prevalent in Niger Delta “may generate local resistance 
movements, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Ogoni People (MOSOP).” They 
argued that “suppression of MOSOP and the execution of its leaders in the early 1990s led to 
the development of violent movements, such as the Niger Delta People‟s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), which successfully reduced Nigeria‟s oil output by half, pushing global oil prices 
higher.” Poorly managed oil wealth can “lead to further conflict between state and society 
and a crisis of national development as in Niger Delta” (Seager and Macalister, 2004).  
 
Regionalism offers one of the most appropriate analytical framework for the study of 
international security dynamics through tools such as Barry Buzan‟s concept of a „regional 
security complex‟ defined in terms of identifiable security interdependence that sets a group 
of (usually, but not necessarily), neighbouring states apart from the rest of the world by virtue 
of the intensity of their security interaction in relative autonomy from the rest of the world. 
Unlike during the Cold war era characterized by conflicts between and among state actors, 
events after 1989 and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States have demonstrated 
that current global crisis management has become more complicated and less promising than 
that of the Cold War period that was dominated by a bipolar structure.  
 
Departing from the state-centric approach, therefore, regional arrangements are being 
wrought to respond to these multifarious security challenges. In this vein, states in the 
northern hemisphere are generally believed to posses the structures and institutions designed 
to prevent conflicts between themselves and other states, although they are less well prepared 
for armed conflicts with non-state actors in so-called asymmetric wars.  Expectedly, regional 
arrangements readily fill the power vacuum although this also poses questions as to whether 
smaller states do become the objects or victims of power politics in a region where such 
regional groups are dominated by regional hegemonies. 
The RSC theory broadens the concept of security by identifying five general categories--
military, environmental, economic, societal and political security. This broadening extends 
the concept of security beyond the state by including human beings and the environment as 
referent objects. For the Copenhagen School, which pioneered the broadening, the key 
security issue is survival and the concerns about security hinges on existential threats. The CS 
model retains the security-survival logic and in the process, the securitization model offers 
analysts “a framework to determine how, why and by whom a specific matter becomes 
securitized” and thereby differentiates between security and non-security threats (Emmers, 
123).  
 
The new wave of regionalization, which started in the late 1980s, posed fresh challenges in 
the realm of theory as well. This „new regionalism‟ transcended the structures of formal inter-
state regional organizations and institutions and is: characterized by its multidimensionality, 
complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and 
non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions. It is 
therefore now appropriate to speak of regionalisms in the plural rather than the singular. This 
plurality is true in terms of both the variety of regionalization processes and the „new‟ 
theoretical approaches. The CS asserts that “Comprehensive security analysis requires that 
one takes particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay between 
states and the international system as a whole” (Buzan 1991, 188). 
 
 Zoleka Ndayi (2003) argues that “regionalism is a body of ideas, values and concrete 
objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security, 
wealth, peace and development within an identifiable area characterised by geographic 
contiguity.” The main defining feature of the new regionalism as opposed to having no 
geographic limitations is actually typified by geographic contiguity with complementarities 
between sub-regional and continental perspectives within the same continent. Soderbaum‟s 
(2000) assertion of a region as mainly constituting a “body of ideas, values, and concrete 
objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and 
wealth, peace, and development”, suggests that where there is a region, regionalism will 
automatically follow.  
 
Ideological expansion in the region as well as organisational growth, in terms of 
accommodating new countries that subscribe to the same ideology in response to the 
widening scope of the purpose, are other elements of regionalism. And therefore, it is not the 
region that changes or expands, rather the purpose of the region and regionalism or 
subscription to the ideology held in the region at that particular time (Ndayi 2006, 11). 
Meenai (1998) refers to regionalism as the „feeling of belonging arising out of 
commonalities, based on geographic contiguity, culture, language, history or socio-economic 
factors.‟ Mansfield and Milner (1999) say “Disputes over the definition of an economic 
region and regionalism hinge on the importance of geographic proximity and on the 
relationship between economic flows and policy choices.” 
 
The Concept, Meaning and Nature of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 
The collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War 
brought in its wake security challenges which diverge from the military sphere hitherto 
handled either unilaterally by one of the superpowers or through multilateral arrangements. 
This new development has forced states whose security are interlinked in a security complex 
to come together at the regional levels to address the myriad of global security challenges. 
When compared to the old regionalism that emphasised economic and military spheres, new 
„regionalism‟ transcends the structures of formal inter-state regional institutions and is 
characterized by multi-functionalism covering societal, environmental and cultural aspects as 
well as the inclusion of a variety of non-state actors, who oftentimes come together in 
informal multi-actor coalitions. 
 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is essentially built on the Constructivist 
assumption of a systemic regional arrangement. Here, security complex is defined as „a set of 
states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another‟ (Buzan, 
1991, 190; Buzan et al. 1998, 11-12). This definition emphasizes three key characteristics as 
prerequisites for a complex to be evolved. These are: geographical proximity, distribution of 
power and historical relations of amity or enmity. In a regional security complex, 
 
[A]ll of the states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. 
But because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than 
over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbours 
more than distant powers; consequently, security interdependence across the international 
system as a whole is far from uniform. The normal pattern of security interdependence in a 
geographically diverse, anarchic international system is one of regionally-based clusters, 
which we label security complexes (Buzan et al., 1998, 11-12). 
 
Security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns 
are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991, 190; Buzan et al. 1998, 11-12). This 
definition emphasizes three key characteristics as prerequisites for a complex to be evolved. 
These are: geographical proximity, distribution of power and historical relations of amity or 
enmity. 
 
Buzan claims that “Security complexes are an empirical phenomenon with historical and 
geopolitical roots. In theoretical terms, they can be derived from both the state and the system 
levels” (Buzan 1991, 191). He explains that that when viewed from the bottom up, “security 
complexes result from interactions between individual states,” adding that if “seen from the 
top down, security complexes are generated by the interaction of anarchy and geography.” 
(Buzan 1991, 191).He, however warns that the security dynamics of the complex are not 
solely determined by the members as “external actors can change the power structure of a 
local complex in two ways: either joining it, if they are adjacent, or by making alignments 
within it, whether they are either adjacent and/or members of a higher-level complex” (Buzan 
1991, 212). Once a security complex takes shape, external powers move directly in a process 
that Buzan calls “overlay” into the local complex and seek to suppress the “indigenous 
security dynamics (Buzan 1991, 220). 
 
Constructivists argue that the corporate identity of the state will generate four core interests. 
These are physical security; ontological security or predictability in relation with the world to 
guarantee stable social identities; recognition as an actor by others above and beyond survival 
through brute force; and development through meeting human aspirations for a better 
life.(Wendt 1994, 386). In terms of collective action against security threats, Wendt 
distinguishes between alliances and collective security arrangements. He posits that alliances 
are temporary coalitions by self-centred states designed to deal with a specific threat, thus it 
finds utility in instrumental objectives and reason. As a corollary of the motive for its 
establishments, alliances do not outlive the threat and they immediately disband once the 
threat is over. On the contrary, collective security systemic states undertake “commitments to 
multilateral actions against non-specific threats.”(Wendt, 386). He argues that “[C]ollective 
identity is neither essential nor equivalent to such a multilateral institution,” although it 
provides the key foundation for it through increasing the willingness to act.  
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, 1994 
views human security as a nexus between freedom from fear and freedom from want. The 
report defines human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and 
repression” as well as “protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life.” In this vein, Alan Collins (2007, 2) asserts that “security is a matter of high 
politics; central to government debates and pivotal to the priorities they establish.”(p.420). He 
postulates that the determination of a security challenge and threat is usually constructed 
through constructive inter-subjective and discursive approach albeit using „high politics.‟  
 
Post-positivist study of security, which aims to broaden our knowledge of security studies 
and its various dimensions, stretch the concept beyond the narrow and one-dimensional 
analysis of positivist theory of national security (Buzan and de Wilde 1998). These post-
positivist scholars, also called constructivists, have been accused of twisting and stretching of 
the idea (of security) far beyond the rational bounds (Jackson, 194). Thus broadening of the 
spheres of security has been criticised by scholars who maintained that the approach makes 
defining security amorphous. For example, Jackson (2003) insists that “the elastic use of the 
notion of „security‟ or „threat‟ is all too common among IR scholars nowadays. The 
predictable result is loss of clarity and the spread of mist and fog in studies of security” 
(Jackson, 195).  
 
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that there are ongoing debates on the desirability or 
otherwise of conceptually marrying welfare and security, or ecology and security as has been 
demonstrated in constructivist notions of security. Jackson believes that “the expressions 
„economic security‟ or „environmental security‟ are instances of category mistakes; they 
conflate two different ideas and thereby foster academic confusion and disorganization. 
Unfortunately, this practice is widespread in positivist social science and in some branches of 
post-positivism, for example constructivism.”(p. 195). These criticisms, notwithstanding, 
constructivism has been found to be relevant in analysing security issues in the pos-cold war 
era because of its insistence on the salience and importance of ideational factors and inter-
subjective approach in understanding security and IR studies.   
 
Characteristics of RSCs 
The SCT perspective originally forwarded by Buzan retained the state-centred approach to 
security studies as well as the pre-eminence of military threats and it places greater emphasis 
on perception and the processes of securitization/de-securitization. The latest version of RSC, 
which is a synthesis of Buzan‟s original work and Weaver‟s ideas as outlined in his article 
“Securitization and De-securitization” (Waever, 1995, 46-8) led to the publication of 
“Security: A new framework for analysis. In it, SCT was defined as “a set of units whose 
major processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, 
Weaver and de Wilde, 201). This new definition has been acclaimed to have moved the SCT 
away from state-centrism with a renewed emphasis on perception and processes of 
securitization/desecuritization. 
 
Scholars generally agree that security is concerned with “threat to survival‟ although there is 
a shifting paradigm on the referent object, that is, what is to be secured. The state has 
traditionally been the referent object frequently deploying the military might to ensure its 
security. Equally important in the analysis of securitization is the central role that institutions 
play as they „institutionalize‟ the process. In 2003, Buzan revised the definition of a regional 
security complex as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, 
or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another”. According to the editor of the volume in which the revision 
appeared: “The revised theory is a reflection of Buzan‟s attempt to move beyond state-centric 
assumptions and also take into account the constructivist method. The units can be states, but 
also other units can be predominant, and security complexes are not givens but constructed in 
the process of securitization.” 
 
Explaining the regional security complex theory, Sheehan (2006) asserts that it “represents a 
group of states whose interests and destinies are sufficiently interlinked that each state‟s 
security cannot be understood except in relation to the other states in the complex.” He 
further argues that such complexes are held together not by the positive influences of shared 
interest, but by shared rivalries and security here operate across a broad spectrum of sectors–
military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Robert Jervis (1983) notes that, 
“Security regimes occur when a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid 
wars by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their 
assumptions about the behaviours of others.”  
 
A security community is a prerequisite to security regime. Deutsch (1968) asserts that “a 
security community is a group of people which has become „integrated‟. By integration we 
mean the attainment, within a territory of a „sense of community‟ and of institutions and 
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of 
„peaceful change‟ among its population. By a „sense of community‟ we mean a belief…that 
common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of „peaceful change‟.” The 
Palme Commission Report of the United Nations (1982) also gave a tacit approval to regional 
security community as a way of reducing the risks of war, armament and nuclear proliferation 
and its associated consequences. It says: 
 
Acceptance of a common security as the organizing principle for efforts to reduce the risk of 
war, limit arms, and move towards disarmament, means, in principle, that cooperation will 
replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interests. This is not to say that differences 
among nations should be expected to disappear…The task is only to ensure that these 
conflicts do not come to be expressed in acts of war, or in preparations for war. It means that 
nations must come to understand that the maintenance of world peace must be given a higher 
priority than the assertion of their own national, ideological or political positions. 
 
Relevance of RSCT to Explaining the Niger Delta Conflict 
A security complex combines both the physical and ideational characteristics of international 
relations to determine the interplay of power relations and the spheres of security cooperation 
and non-cooperation. Bae and Moon observe that „a security complex can be reinterpreted as 
the combination of physical arrangements of component parts and underlying ideas and 
impulses affecting interactions among those parts‟ (Bae & Moon, 2005). Strong states build 
their national identities based on national or society-wide consensus, while the reverse is true 
of weak states (Buzan, 1983). This observation may well apply to the study of nationalism 
and national identity vis-a`-vis ethnic diversity in the Niger Delta although Nigeria as a major 
player and regional hegemon in West Africa has built a strong military establishment which 
is recognized as major player in security and stability in the region.  
 
There is an increasing awareness of the need to tackle secessionist agitations at its roots 
which demands not only economic prosperity and more financial resources at the disposal of 
governments, but more equitable distribution of wealth and better governance. 
Democratization and the rule of law therefore cannot be avoided in the pursuit of security 
broadly defined. Cheng (2006) argues that many regional governments “understand that 
economic growth alone may not be sufficient to ensure political stability; they must pay more 
attention to more equitable income distribution, poverty alleviation, the strengthening of the 
rule of law, the combat of corruption, etc. In summary, comprehensive security must include 
good governance.” Green (2000) insists that “Security Complex Theory allows external and 
systemic influences to be compartmentalised, (thereby) revealing the „natural‟ course of 
regional security dynamics,” even as he assumes a durable structure of regional security 
based on identifiable securitizing actors, security referent objects and threats (Green, 2000). 
     
One of the usefulness of the securitisation approach to security analysis is that it affords the 
researcher the “possibility of comparing the importance of other sectors without privileging 
the military above all the others” (Herring, 2007, 136-7). Kaski (2000) argues that although 
there are five levels of comprehensive security (military, societal, economic, political, and 
environmental) as popularised by Buzan et al.(1998), security complex can be theoretically 
analysed in three broad aspects: the power complex, the functional complex and the 
historical-cultural complex, which represent the anarchic relations, functional linkages, and 
historical amities and enmities, respectively. He notes that this typology notwithstanding, 
“the security complex is essentially one entity, a regional system that could be argued to be 
more than just the sum of its component parts.”  
 
Strong states build their national identities based on national or society-wide consensus, 
while the reverse is true of weak states (Buzan, 1983). This observation may well apply to the 
study of nationalism and national identity vis-a`-vis ethnic diversity in the Niger Delta 
although Nigeria as a major player and regional hegemon in West Africa has built a strong 
military establishment which is recognized as major player in security and stability in the 
region. There is an increasing awareness of the need to tackle secessionist agitations at its 
roots which demands not only economic prosperity and more financial resources at the 
disposal of governments, but more equitable distribution of wealth and better governance. 
Democratization and the rule of law therefore cannot be avoided in the pursuit of security 
broadly defined. 
 
Cheng (2006) argues that many regional governments “understand that economic growth 
alone may not be sufficient to ensure political stability; they must pay more attention to more 
equitable income distribution, poverty alleviation, the strengthening of the rule of law, the 
combat of corruption, etc. In summary, comprehensive security must include good 
governance.” Muna distinguishes between vertical and horizontal security; the former 
encompassing the safeguard of the state‟s population and sovereignty and territorial integrity 
free from external threats while the latter transcends state boundaries such as environmental 
security, epidemic diseases and transnational crime. He surmises that many developing 
countries are confronted with both vertical and horizontal security axes characterised by state 
centric policy as opposed to human security. 
 
Regional Security Challenges in the Niger Delta, Gulf of Guinea and West Africa 
Abdelwahab El-Affendi (2009) says, “Convinced that threats to security in the post-Cold War 
era derived mainly from domestic or regional dynamics, the leading industrial powers wanted 
to subcontract the burden of safeguarding neighbourhood security to designated regional 
bodies.” The latter were also expected to promote “cooperative security arrangements based 
on mutual reassurance, rather than deterrence, and also promote economic and political 
cooperation” (El-Affendi, 2009). 
 He argues that the United Nations and other major powers felt that the role of regional bodies 
could help mitigate ethnic and communal conflict by severing the “historic link between 
sovereignty and self-determination‟ through the creation of broader regional identities, which 
would de-emphasize state sovereignty and offer disadvantaged minorities a broader 
framework within which they could meet dominant national minorities on the basis of 
equality. (p. 2). In the United Nations Secretary-General‟s 1992 report An Agenda for Peace 
and in the follow-up report of 1995 (Supplement to an agenda for peace), regional 
organizations were acknowledged as having a significant role in peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, a role the Secretary-General saw both as a form of functional decentralization 
needed to unburden the overstretched UN system, and as an effective democratization of the 
system.(Boutrous-Ghali, 1992).  
 
The Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) lists 
thirty (30) contemporary security threats, euphemistically referred to as transnational crimes 
faced by most African countries, although the document also distinguishes between those 
threats that are internal to Africa and those that are externally influenced. The internal threats 
are grouped under four headings: interstate conflicts/tensions, intrastate conflicts/tensions, 
unstable post-conflict situations, and other factors that engender insecurity. Haacke and 
Williams (2003) note that although transnational challenges such as terrorism and 
proliferation in small arms and light weapons were not explicitly identified, they were 
subsumed under the category of “other factors engendering insecurity” and these include the 
insecurity exacerbated by refugees problem, the illicit proliferation, circulation and 
trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), infectious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis), human trafficking, drug trafficking, and money laundering.  
 
The CADSP also identified common external threats to include transnational challenges, such 
as the negative effect of globalization, weapons of mass destruction-related issues, and cross-
border crimes. Haacke and Williams assert that African states have implicitly transnational 
threats fuelled through “aggression” by non-state actors, contextualised as actions “involving 
the use, intentionally and knowingly, of armed force or any hostile act against the 
sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and human security of the population 
of a signatory state.” Haacke and Williams say that based on the AU documents, it is safe to 
conclude that the regional body has securitized four transnational threats namely: the 
trafficking of SALW, terrorism, infectious diseases, and aggression by non-state actors, 
maybe due to their potential negative effects on security in the continent. 
 
Williams and Savona say that transnational crimes threaten national and international security 
and stability; it undermines and challenges the political s and legislative authority of the state, 
disrupts the gains of social and economic institutions and dividends of democracy, attenuates 
development, diverts its gains and exploits human vulnerability. TNCs threaten state 
sovereignty, societies and individuals, jeopardises national stability and state control, 
democratic values and public institutions, financial institutions, developmental process, 
global regimes and codes of conduct.    
 
Impact of the Niger Delta Crisis 
In their quest to force the Federal Government to listen to their agitations the militants have 
attacked Federal Government and multinational oil firms security forces. They have 
“sabotaged oil installations, taken foreign oil workers hostage and carried out lethal car 
bombings. At the root of the problem is a crisis of underdevelopment. The crisis has been 
exacerbated by emergent issues of a gross distortion of Nigerian federalism in respect to 
resource control; citizenship rights and environmental degradation” (Ejibunu 2007). The 
Brussels-based International Crisis Group, estimated that Nigeria losses between 70,000 and 
300,000 barrels per day to illegal bunkering (ICG 2006, 8), which represents the equivalent 
output of a small oil producing country. It added that Shell Nigeria‟s annual report released in 
late August 2006, estimated illegal bunkering losses at 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day in 
2005, down from 40,000 to 60,000 in 2004 (ICG 2006, 8). 
 
“Nigeria has earned over $400 Billion as oil revenue since the early 70s (ICG 2006, 1). 
Despite these huge foreign exchange earnings, the economy under- performs, and the great 
majority of the people have not been able to derive much benefits. Poverty, unemployment, 
decay infrastructure, corruption at high level, misery, lack of basic human needs etc, etc 
seems to be the lot of the people” (Ejibunu 2007). Developemnt initiatives often fashioned 
and implemted in a top down mode, have been lopsided with less satisfactory impact on the 
lives of the indigenous population. “Despite 40 years of oil production and hundreds of 
billions of dollars of oil revenue, the local people remain in abject poverty without even the 
most basic amenities such as water and electricity” (Ejibunu 2007). 
 
The arrow-head of the Niger Delta struggle, late novelist Kenule Saro-Wiwa, declared in his 
famous speech that “In Niger Delta, scenes of abject poverty pervade the area, very similar to 
what you find in a refugee camp,” even when “the region fetches the government oil revenue 
within the region of $100M a day” (Saro-Wiwa 1997). The most significant contributory 
factor in the drudgery being experienced in the Delta region is corruption and general 
economic mismanagement. A former Chairman of the Nigerian Anti-Graft body, the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, argued that in 
70 per cent of oil revenues, more than $14 billion was stolen or wasted in 2003 (Brisibe 
2007).  
 
The International Herald Tribune asserts that “Oil companies find themselves in an uneasy 
position, stuck in a crisis that they, in a sense, helped create. For years, human rights groups 
accused them of turning a blind eye to the corruption of Nigeria‟s successive military regimes 
while damaging the environment in the delta”. The Washington-based Council on Foreign 
Relations Independent Task Force calculated that a loss of just 70,000 barrels a day at a price 
of $60 a barrel “would generate over $1.5 billion per year-ample resources to fund arms 
trafficking, buy political influence, or both” (ICG 2006, 8). The body postulates that “one 
day‟s worth of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta (at 100,000 barrels and $15bbl) will 
buy quality weapons for and sustain a group of 1,500 youths for two months.” 
 
The negative impact of the oil resource in the Niger Delta is well known. Volman (2003) 
argues that “In the oil producing region of southeast Nigeria, oil extraction has done 
enormous damage, disrupted social stability, and provoked extensive violence by government 
forces and in political conflicts between local peoples, without contributing much to regional 
economic development.” The resource often derisively termed „curse‟ has also ignited super 
power interest in the region. Klare and Volman (2006) assert that “Desperate to procure 
additional supplies of foreign oil (to make up for the decline in domestic output), the Bush 
administration has made strenuous efforts to increase the role of US energy firms in African 
production. But because instability in Africa is an obstacle to such investment, it has sought 
to boost the internal security capacity of friendly African states and has laid the groundwork 
for direct US military involvement in Africa.”  
 
Nigeria can aptly be described as a weak state. These states possess one or more of the 
following characteristics: infrastructural incapacity evidenced by weak institutions and the 
inability to penetrate and control society effectively or enforce state policies; lack of coercive 
power and a failure to achieve or maintain a monopoly on the instruments of violence; and 
the lack of national identity and social and political consensus on the idea of the state. Ayoob 
(1995) argues that the insecurity in weak post-colonial state is symptomatic of the normal 
conditions and processes of state-building. He argues that the conditions of insecurity in weak 
states are an expression of the historical state-building process similarly trodden by European 
states even with more bloody phases and longer processes. He posits that essentially weak 
states face the state building process in an environment constrained by the experience of 
colonialism, a shortened time-frame and problematic international norms such as democratic 
principles, human rights and right to self determination, among others.  
 
In this vein, different studies by Collier (2000) and de Soysa (2000, 113-136)  suggest that 
strong states generally possess the wherewithal to manage resource control agitations as these 
states “tend to be less prone to internal conflicts” when compared to states undergoing 
“significant economic and political transitions”. The latter category, which includes Nigeria, 
among other third world countries, is “relatively more prone to internal violent conflict.” 
These studies emphasised the central role of poverty “as a causal variable in internal wars” 
(Barnett, 192).  
 
Basically, there are three assumptions in environment-security nexus researchers. The first 
emphasises that unequal consumption of scarce resources triggers violent conflicts especially 
in low income resource-dependent societies; the second stresses that rising population often 
have causal relationship to conflicts; and the third harps on the penchant for failure of 
adaptive mechanisms to environmental changes to threaten and exacerbate violent conflicts 
(Barnett, 191). However, Homer-Dixon (1999) and Baechler (1999) insist that environmental 
change, when properly managed does not constitute an immediate cause of conflict although 
it sometimes exacerbates it.  Both also emphasise that environmental change „is unlikely to 
be a cause of war between countries (Barnett, 191), although they were silent on intra country 
violence over scarce resources. 
 
Recent empirical studies on resource related violence, especially those pioneered by Watts 
(2001, 189-212), focusing on the Niger Delta region isolated “unequal outcomes of social and 
environmental changes” characterised by “inadequate distribution of the return from resource 
extraction activities”(Barnett 2007) as a catalyst to violent agitations that has in recent times 
characterised the Niger delta region. Similar studies focused on West Kalimatan (Peluso and 
Harwell, 2001, 83-116), and Bougainville Island (Boge, 1999, 211-27). According to Barnett 
(2007, 191), these studies show that “a range of intervening economic, political , and cultural 
processes  that produce and sustain power are seen as more important in causing (and 
preventing and resolving) violent conflict than the actual material environmental changes that 
take place.” In the context of the Niger Delta crisis Barnett‟s postulates that the structure of 
the state is a determining factor in devising an amicable solution to violent resource-related 
agitations with potent regional security implications.  
 
In effect, “the (US) pursuit of African oil has taken on the character of a gold rush, with 
major companies from all over the world competing fiercely with one another for access to 
promising reserves. This `oil rush' has enormous implications both for African oil producers 
and for the major oil-importing countries. For the producing countries it promises both new-
found wealth and a potential for severe internal discord over the allocation of oil revenues (or 
`rents'); for the consuming countries, it entails growing dependence on imports of a vital 
substance from a region of chronic instability, with obvious national security overtones. Both 
these trends are reflected in US policy towards African oil”( Klare and Volman 2006). 
 
During his July 2002 visit to Nigeria, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter 
Kansteiner declared that “African oil is of strategic national interest to us” adding “it will 
increase and become more important as we go forward.” Volman notes that “while American 
interest in oil and other strategic raw materials from Africa is not new, the Bush 
Administration‟s decision to define African oil as a “strategic national interest” and thus, a 
resource that the United States might choose to use military force to control is completely 
unprecedented and deeply disturbing.” Volman (2003) postulates that “because oil revenues 
are managed by central governments that are often neither democratic nor financially 
transparent, the money generated by oil production often does not contribute to national 
economic development, but is instead diverted into the bank accounts of government officials 
or used to finance unnecessary prestige projects. The misuse of oil revenues exacerbates 
political discontent and can provoke internal political violence.”  
 
The oil-violence nexus, though controversial portends a grave danger for many African 
countries and the spectre is already playing out in Nigeria‟s Niger Delta. Volman (2003) 
argues that due to “the instability and lack of democracy in most African countries and the 
difficulty of solving political problems by peaceful means, possession of oil is certain to 
continue to promote the militarization of African countries and to provoke both internal and 
inter-state violence. He asserts that “The possession of oil resources, and the revenues that 
accrue to governments from the exploitation of this resource, have had a decisive impact on 
the security and stability of nearly every African country that has significant amounts of oil. 
This has been true in the past and oil is certain to have a similar impact on those countries 
where it is only now being discovered and exploited.” 
 
A continent-wide survey would illustrate the oil-violence nexus although few exceptions such 
as Gabon exist. “Oil production yields vast revenues for African governments. This allows 
them to make large arms purchases, to build up their military forces, and to strengthen 
internal security forces. However, it also can lead to internal political conflict and violence 
because it increases the stakes of political competition and encourages rival leaders and 
parties to resort to the use of force to gain control of the oil revenues” (Volman, 2003). He 
asserts that “foreign oil companies have sometimes purchased arms themselves and 
distributed them to Nigerian military units deployed in the Niger Delta to suppress local 
discontent.” 
 
Efforts to De-escalate the Crisis 
Nigeria plans to establish a security agency for the Niger Delta region (Reuters 2009), 
following the acceptance of a presidential amnesty offer by „the most prominent rebel 
commanders‟ in the Niger Delta struggle. However, there are palpable fears that continued 
military presence in the region would escalate the simmering crisis. The report revealed that 
the maritime security agency is expected to provide “security information on oil and gas 
pipelines, rigs, platforms and all other established ...installations” as well as safeguard 
shipping and port facilities in the Niger Delta (Reuters 2009). 
It should be stressed that a genuine process of the resolution of the crisis does not require 
building up military presence in the area. The views from abroad are not different from what 
had been widely adumbrated at home. To resolve the security quagmire that the Niger Delta 
portends, the US and other stakeholders must ensure “a properly funded democratization 
program” in order to “secure American and Nigerian security interests and quell the 
insurgencies, criminality and social banditry now rampant in the Delta.” This measure would 
entail institutionalized free and fair elections, addressing youth unemployment, compensating 
communities for damages, raising living standards, empowering civil society groups to 
monitor public funds and negotiating local resource control (Lubeck et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, Enerique Fernando Arrundell, the Venezuelan Ambassador to Nigeria, 
delivered a bitter truth when he visited Nigeria‟s Minister of Information and 
Communications, Dora Akunyili in Abuja recently. Upon Akunyili‟s request for assistance 
from Venezuela, he advised: 
 "Before 1999, we had three or four foreign companies working with us. That time 
they were taking 80 per cent, and giving us 20. Now, we have 90 per cent, and we 
give them 10 per cent. But now, we have 22 countries working with us in that 
condition...60 percent of the income goes to social programmes. 
“That‟s why we have 22,000 medical doctors assisting the people in the community. 
The people don't go to the hospital; doctors go to their houses. This is because the 
money is handled by the Venezuelans. How come Nigeria that has more technical 
manpower than Venezuela, with 150 million people, and very intellectual people all 
around, not been able to get it right? The question is: If you are not handling your 
resources, how are you going to handle the country? 
"So, it is important that Nigeria takes control of her resources. We have no illiterate 
people. We have over 17 new universities totally free. I graduated from the university 
without paying one cent, and take three meals every day, because we have the 
resources. We want the resources of the Nigerian people for the Nigerians. It is 
enough! It is enough, Minister!" (234Next Online 2009). 
U.S. Role in the Conflict 
Not many Americans appreciated “the scale and significance of Nigerian oil and gas 
production centred in the Delta and how this complex impacts American energy security” 
(Lubeck et al. 2007). Thus, the U.S. already faced by dwindling oil source from the Gulf 
occasioned by the crisis in the region, “has quietly institutionalized a West African-based oil 
supply strategy.” Under the American oil and energy supply plan, Nigeria, which currently 
provides 10-12 percent of U.S. imports, would serve as “the cornerstone of this Gulf of 
Guinea strategy.” Meanwhile, Nigeria remains a vital oil supplier to the US and other 
Western countries. According to the US National Energy Policy Development Group, 
 
Along with Latin America, West Africa is expected to be one of fastest-growing 
sources of oil and gas for the American market…. Nigeria, in partnership with the 
private sector, has set ambitious production goals as high as 5 million barrels of oil 
per day over the coming decade (NEPDG 2001, 8-11).  
 
Lubeck et al. argue that “the escalating political crisis in the Delta threatens American energy 
security, the security of Nigeria‟s fledgling democracy and, indeed, the entire West African 
region as a source of reliable energy” (2007). The growing insecurity of U.S. oil supplies 
reflects what Michael Klare has called the „economization of security,‟ (Klare 2004) an 
important strand of U.S. foreign policy since the 1930s, which has focused on global oil 
acquisition policy (Sanger 2006).  
 Assessing the role of the International Community in resolving the Niger Delta debacle, a 
Nigerian analyst on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Benjamin Akande, said, “the 
truth of the matter is that Nigeria may need outside help to deal with this situation. The U.S., 
the European Union, or the African Union could come into this conversation and help resolve 
this issue” (BBC News, 2007). “Fears that China is gaining control over African energy 
resources, e.g. Angola, are important to the new emphasis on securitization of energy policy, 
as well as bureaucratic competition for control over resources among the regional commands 
of the U.S. military” (Lubeck et al. 2006).  
 
It is expected that the US would continue to do all within its powers to secure the oil source 
in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea although no direct intervention as is the case in Iraq 
is visible in the horizon even though there is a trend toward increased American military 
involvement in West Africa‟s oil regions especially, in Nigeria‟s Niger Delta. “As long as the 
United States‟ energy security policy relies on increasing amounts of imported oil, and 
Nigeria depends completely on oil and gas exports to fund its mono-export economy, the 
security interests of Nigeria and the U.S. will remain deeply intertwined”(Lubeck et al. 
2007). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The struggle in the Niger Delta Region is symptomatic of the failure of the Nigerian state to 
plough back substantial part of the resources derived from the area for it development. Pierre 
Trudeau‟s strategy for checking centrifugal tendencies, as summarised by Wole Soyinka is as 
follows: “Create conditions that make fragmentation undesirable ...cultivate an overall 
national image that is so appealing that it makes separation unattractive” (Soyinka, 2001).  
 
Nigeria‟s federalism needs to be strengthened and practised according to the spirit and letter 
of the Constitution. Federal practices have been acknowledged to posses inherent centripetal 
characteristics that unite and galvanise the state for even development. Rosenbloom and 
Kravchuk (2002, 106) argue that “because the national government can act directly on the 
people and seek to represent them, the chances for separatist nuts to develop and be 
successful sin a federal system such as the United States are greatly reduced.” This cannot be 
said of the Nigerian federalism in although the Constitution explicitly states these objectives.   
It is widely acknowledged that “political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of 
the state. Their purpose may range from pressurising the government on a particular policy, 
through overthrowing the government, to fermenting secessionism, and disrupting the 
political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack” (Buzan 1991, 119).   
 
The Nigerian state must begin to address economic insecurity and other threats in various 
ramifications. According to Barnett (2007, 191), “Economic security entails safeguarding the 
structural integrity and prosperity-generating capabilities and interests of a politico-economic 
entity in the context of various externalised risks and threats that confront it in the 
international economic system.” Economic-security nexus is defined as the linkages between 
economic policy and traditional or politico-military security policy. Emancipation refers to 
the freeing of people from the structures of oppression or domination in which they find 
themselves.  
 
Various forms of critical theory are driven by a political commitment to emancipation from 
different structures of oppression and domination. “National security cannot be considered 
apart from the internal structure of the state, and the view from within not infrequently 
explodes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object f security” (Buzan 1991, 103) 
There is an almost unbreakable cord between the economy and political stability. “The link 
between economy and political stability generates a set of wide-ranging questions about 
development that could not unreasonably, be seen as national security issues.” (Buzan 1991, 
129). 
 
Fragile states portend grave danger to the regional security and global security. Thus, when 
more weak states are unleashed on the international community, the domestic threat will 
exacerbate and this insecurity will spill over into regional relations thereby creating hostile 
relations with neighbouring countries. Certainly, “refugees and guerrillas will cross borders, 
and unstable elites will seek to bolster their position by cultivating foreign threats. Outside 
powers will find it difficult not to be drawn into this turbulence, especially if they are 
competing with each other for spheres of influence, whether ideological, military or 
economic” (Buzan 1991, 157). 
 
Even a civil war confined to a territory would inflict disruptions on the systemic balance of 
the region. Civil war is a process of severe disruption: It destroys existing structures, 
networks, and loyalties; it creates new opportunities for political losers, alters the size of 
optimal coalitions, gives rise to new entrepreneurs, and generally reshuffles politics. 
Therefore, it has the potential to alter the structure of cleavages and generate realignment in 
identity affiliations, thus destabilizing and even changing a country‟s ethnic demography 
(Kalyvas 2008).  
 
It is understandable why there is so much frenzy about the Niger Delta. “Although as a rule 
states will contest all challenges to their territorial integrity, some pieces of territory are 
clearly more valuable than others. This value may arise because of resources, like oil...Such 
territory will have much higher priority as an object of security than other areas, and some 
territory will very low priority” (Buzan 1991, 92). Military intervention can only suppress but 
it cannot eliminate agitations and the advice by Buzan that “value of a given territory may 
rise or fall with changes in the technological, strategic or economic environment, or with 
discoveries about its resource potential. States possessing a territory with international 
strategic significance may easily find that it becomes a source of threat to the state because it 
promotes intervention or attack” (Buzan 1991, 93). Therefore, the Nigerian state must guard 
against subtle intervention under whatever guise. This can only be achieved through 
assuaging the grievances and agitations of the Niger Delta people. 
 
If examined from its roots, as Arendt (1993) posits, we would appreciate the fact that the 
crisis in the Niger Delta was a reaction to age long neglect which degenerated into rage. 
Arendt says, 
  
...rage is by no means an automatic reaction to misery and suffering as such; no one 
reacts with rage to a disease beyond the powers of medicine or to an earthquake or, 
for that matter, to social conditions which seem to be unchangeable. Only when there 
is reason to suspect that conditions could be changed and are not, does rage arise. 
Only when our sense of justice is offended do we react with rage....The point is that 
under certain circumstances violence, which is to act without argument or speech and 
without reckoning with consequences, is the only possibility of setting the scales of 
justice right again (Arendt 1993: 65-66 [1999]). 
 
As Fortman (2007) argued, most violent conflicts are ignited by „original injustices‟ and 
naturally the victims of the original injustices would demand that the sins be redressed by 
whatever means at their disposal. He says, 
  
The point is that in all situations of violent conflict, there are original injustices that 
lie at the roots of it. The main reason why hostilities can be stopped in the end is that 
those involved realise that the violence of the war is even worse than the original 
injustices. But at the same time they will expect these original injustices to be dealt 
with after the cessation of hostilities. Expectations are raised that life will continue as 
it used to be but that there will be an improvement, a public path towards justice (p. 
162).  
 
As surmised by Reuben Abati, government should create employment opportunities for the 
„army of unemployed, unemployable youths‟ in the country. The Chairman of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Youth and Social Development, Mr. Dapo Oyedokun was 
recently quoted as saying "Of the over 40 million youths in the country, 23 million are 
unemployable and therefore susceptible to crime..." This is what the Federal Government 
should be more concerned about. The army of unemployed, unemployable youths continues 
to grow largely due to bad governance and the collapse of industry and the education sector. 
Leadership failure is at the heart of the dilemma (The Guardian, Friday October 16, 2009).  
 
Buzan argues that “secessionist movements offer a wealth of opportunity for foreign 
intervention, and rarely occur without importing some level of national security into the 
domestic arena” (Buzan 1991). The Nigerian state cannot afford to be plunged into a civil 
war. “Even a strong state must guard against subversive penetration of its political and 
military fabric by foreign agents and interests, but for a strong state the concept of national 
security is primarily about protecting its independence, political identity and way of life from 
external threats arising within its own fabric” (Buzan 1991, 103). 
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